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Ethnic Networks, Extra-legal
Certainty and Globalisation: Peering
into the Diamond Industry
BARAK D RICHMAN*
INTRODUCTION
AS THE CONTRIBUTORS in this volume colourfully illustrate, itis no small task to ensure legal certainty in transnational com-merce, and the challenge becomes increasingly acute as commercial
exchange becomes ever more globalised. One might expect, however, that
the diamond industry would remain largely unaffected by this trend of
globalisation. Because diamonds are easily portable, universally valuable
and virtually untraceable, state courts are incapable of enforcing executory
contracts for diamond sales (Richman, 2004; 2006). In other words, the
diamond industry has never enjoyed legal certainty. Instead, it has relied on
extra-legal certainty—a non-state system of contract enforcement that rests
on personal exchange and reputation mechanisms. What then does globali-
sation mean for diamond merchants?
In fact, globalisation has had, and is having, a striking impact on the
diamond industry, and the millennia-old distribution system that relied on
multiple layers of personal exchange is showing cracks, or growth marks,
depending on the perspective. This chapter explores how globalisation has
affected the diamond industry’s distribution networks, and some extrapo-
lation might inform how globalisation affects not just legal certainty, but
even a well-developed system of extra-legal certainty. As increasing tran-
snational commerce pushes many industries away from state-sponsored
law and towards new forms of private ordering (Appelbaum et al, 2001),
* The author thanks Joy Hanson and Qasim Jami for their excellent research
assistance, the participants of the Oñati workshop for their valuable insights and lively
discussion and, especially, Volkmar Gessner for his spirited and steady leadership in
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the changing diamond industry can offer insights not only into how
globalisation is affecting networks relying on extra-legal enforcement, but
also into globalisation itself.
ALTERNATIVE UNDERSTANDINGS OF PRIVATE CONTRACTUAL
ENFORCEMENT
Two fairly distinct accounts have emerged from prior examinations of
contractual enforcement in the diamond industry, and these separate,
although not mutually exclusive, reports mirror alternative theoretical
expositions of private contractual enforcement. The first account was
made famous by Bernstein’s (1992) seminal article explaining how dia-
mond merchants have ‘opted out’ of employing the state-sponsored legal
system to adjudicate contractual disputes. Bernstein’s approach, which she
later applied to the food and grain (Bernstein, 1996) and the cotton
industries (Bernstein, 2001), illustrates how merchant groups create tai-
lored substantive contract law and private arbitration procedures to govern
their transactions. In this account, social norms reinforce industry customs
and trade rules to provide a private system of expert and efficient dispute
resolution that is faster, more accurate and thus more reliable than
enforcement in state-sponsored courts. Konradi (2008, in this volume)
usefully applies this template to understand how industry associations,
relational contracts and standardised arbitration support transnational
transactions in the timber industry, and this approach has brought schol-
arly attention both to the pervasiveness and economic significance of
industry contract rules and private arbitration.
A second account of the diamond industry focuses not on the attractive-
ness of private arbitration, but, rather, on the ineffectiveness of state-
sponsored courts. This approach, which I chart in previous works
(Richman, 2004; 2006), begins with the recognition that state courts
simply cannot credibly enforce a diamond credit sale: a party that refuses
to make payment can easily escape the reach of a particular court and
enjoy the value of unpaid (stolen) diamonds in a foreign jurisdiction.
According to this approach, the ineffectiveness of public courts compels
the industry to devise its own system of extra-legal enforcement. Tailored
systems of law and efficient arbitration procedures are thus built atop an
enforcement system that employs social norms, community coercion and
sharp reputation mechanisms. Reliance on extra-legal enforcement comes
at considerable costs—entry is limited to parties, usually individuals with
ethnic or family connections to current merchants, who are familiar to
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industry members; thus the industry is deprived of entrepreneurial new-
comers and the dynamism that accompanies the threat of entry (Richman,
2004)—but extra-legal enforcement is the only credible governance mecha-
nism available.
While the first account of the diamond industry offers a template that is
readily applied to other industries with repeat players and standardised
transactions (including the timber industry), the second account suggests
that the diamond industry is rather unique, or is at least an extreme
illustration of the limitations of public courts. The first account suggests
that tailored law and specialised arbitration procedures can offer efficien-
cies to many industries, and thus explains the proliferation of industry-
wide arbitration and a pervasive trend of ‘opting out’ of state court
enforcement. Although the second account recognises the many inefficien-
cies created by state court procedures and the costliness of resolving
disputes in public courts, it suggests that wholesale abandonment of public
courts is an act of necessity that is required of very few, perhaps no, other
industries.
This second approach explains why the diamond industry is insular,
ethnically homogeneous and has remained largely unchanged for nearly
one millennium. The industry resorts today to the same community
enforcement mechanisms that it did before the rise of modern courts, when
most other industries were transformed by the rise of credible impersonal
exchange and the introduction of dynamic entrants (Greif, 2006a). This
second approach also reveals the forces that determine the industry’s
structure. The central challenge in diamond transactions is enforcing the
credit sale, and institutions that can assure credible exchange for such
portable, untraceable and extremely valuable goods will play a role in the
industry’s future.
BACKGROUND—THE DIAMOND SUPPLY CHAIN, THE ECONOMICS
OF CUTTING AND SORTING, AND THE PRIVATE ORDERING OF
GLOBAL NETWORKS
Appreciating transactional governance in the diamond industry first
requires an exploration of the industry’s global architecture, which is
illustrated by a diamond’s path from the mine to the jewellery manufac-
turer. The journey for most diamonds begins in African, Russian, Austral-
ian and Canadian mines, with approximately 65 per cent of rough
diamond production being controlled by DeBeers, either through direct
ownership or long-term exclusive buying contracts. DeBeers distributes
rough stones through its Diamond Trading Company (or DTC, formally
known as the Central Selling Organisation, or CSO) in London, and the
DTC sells the stones in pre-sorted boxes, with take-it-or-leave-it price
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offers, to approximately 100 specific merchants known as ‘sight-holders’.
The DTC’s centralised distribution system enables DeBeers to control
global supply and quality, and consequently diamond prices have remained
remarkably stable compared to other commodities (Spar, 2006).
From this small collection of sight-holders, diamonds descend into a
thick web of intermediaries and slowly make their way down the supply
chain to jewellery manufacturers (rough diamonds not controlled by
DeBeers, and sold directly from mines, descend into the same distribution
network). Sight-holders and other players atop the distribution pyramid
sell parcels of their rough diamonds to individual dealers, who in turn
resell smaller parcels to other dealers. For many stones, and for approxi-
mately 80 per cent of the DTC diamonds, the second round of transactions
takes place in Antwerp at its four large diamond bourses, and from there
diamond dealers disperse to sell their stones throughout the world.
The primary activity in diamond distribution is sorting. Diamond dealers
atop the distribution pyramid (a profitable location to occupy) have
comparatively large inventories, and they sell parcels of gradually declining
size to downstream dealers. The sorting process goes hand-in-hand with
the process of cutting or polishing, which converts opaque rough diamonds
into gem-quality diamonds for retail. Some Antwerp merchants arrange to
polish the stones themselves, and many others sell rough diamonds to
other dealers, who then orchestrate cutting in India, China, Israel, New
York and other locations. Many merchants also use brokers, who work on
small commissions, to assist these sales and find the best price for a given
stone. Parcels are sold and resold, stones are cut and recut, and gradually
they make their way to jewellery manufacturers for commercial sale.
The process of sorting and cutting adds significant value to the stones—
the total value of diamonds in retail jewellery is approximately 75 per cent
more than the value of mined stones. Since there is little retail demand for
uncut diamonds, it is clear that cutting and polishing stones for jewellery
manufacturing adds value. However, cutting raw diamonds is not a
commoditised process, like refining oil into usable gasoline. It is both an
art and a science. With the exception of cutting very small stones, which
can be cut in large quantities through an industrial process, diamond
cutting is done by hand. A cutter sits before a spinning grinding wheel and
carefully applies the stone to the wheel. Although diamond cutting is a
skilled occupation (there are cutting schools, run by ‘master cutters’, in
several diamond centres throughout the world), the requisite skills vary
significantly. Cutting small stones of relatively little value, for example,
requires far less training and specialised skills than cutting large diamonds
with few flaws. Accordingly, cutting factories vary significantly in the
prices they charge, the labour they employ and the wages they pay.
A good amount of value is also created through the nuanced process of
matching individual stones with the manufacturers and retailers who value
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them highly. Diamonds, especially high-end stones, feature subtle
differences—beyond the standard qualities reflected in grading for the ‘four
Cs’—colour, cut, carat and clarity—that translate into significant variation
in manufacturers’ willingness to pay. Accordingly, the objective of the
distribution chain is to find the optimal buyer for the individual stone, and
the middlemen who can find the optimal match can secure a substantial
profit. The process requires synthesising significant market information
with inventory availability—hustling to know what sellers have and what
buyers want. Like most open exchanges (including stock exchanges) that
facilitate transactions between sellers and buyers, the matching process is
significantly aided by organising trading in centralised locations, so most
matching occurs at the 25 diamond bourses located in the world’s major
diamond markets.
Extra-legal enforcement is especially relied upon at these downstream
locations on the supply chain, and thus the downstream supply chain is
populated by ethnically homogeneous merchants who are subject to, and
are acutely motivated by, extra-legal social sanctions that punish merchants
who fail to comply with their contractual obligations. Accordingly, one of
the most distinguishing features of the downstream distribution network is
the predominance of Jewish merchants, and this predominance has deep
historical roots. Jewish merchants enjoyed a virtual monopoly of Europe’s
diamond market for several centuries, reaching back as early as the late
fifteenth century, when Jews escaping the Spanish Inquisition set up the
world’s largest diamond market in Amsterdam. Jewish merchants also
dominated the German market in the seventeenth century, England’s early
diamond trading with India in the eighteenth century, and the DeBeers
syndicate in the twentieth century. Jewish merchants remained deeply
active in the twentieth century’s downstream markets of cutting, polishing
and brokering diamonds, and developed major diamond centres in New
York, Antwerp and Tel Aviv (Grayzel, 1968; Baron, 1975; Richman,
2006). I have argued previously that the community ties that bond Jewish
diamond merchants to each other give the community’s merchants a
comparative advantage over non-members. Core community institutions
provide Jewish merchants with a reliable private contractual enforcement
and enable Jewish merchants to commit credibly to credit sales (Richman,
2004; 2006). Thus, intimate and pervasive community institutions provide
the extra-legal certainty that enables Jewish merchants to overcome the
hazards of the diamond transaction.
In summary, the distribution chain collects uncut stones in London and
Antwerp and matches them with high-valuing jewellery manufacturers
located throughout the world. In the process, stones pass through the
hands of several middlemen—cutters, brokers, and dealers—to find the
ultimate buyer. Each middleman profits from each transaction—cutters are
paid for their services, brokers earn commissions on sales, and dealers
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profit by mark ups—so the ultimate objective is to maximise the value
created by an optimal match, while minimising the required cutting and
sorting costs of doing so. This pyramidal distribution system, with
monopolist DeBeers sitting at the top, has been in place and has remained
largely unchanged since Cecil Rhodes founded the company in 1880.
Furthermore, for centuries, including long before DeBeers controlled global
supply, diamonds relied on an army of middlemen to reach the world’s
buyers. Until the entry of relative newcomers in the 1980s, this distribution
system was dominated by Jewish merchants.
ENTER INDIA
Perhaps the most significant feature of economic globalisation has been the
entry of low-wage labourers in developing countries into the labour market
for producing goods that are marketed in developed economies. This has
occurred in the diamond industry with tremendous force as India has
become a major centre for diamond cutting, and in doing so it has
transformed the diamond global distribution network.
India’s recent entry into modern diamond production has by no means
been the country’s first encounter with the diamond industry. To the
contrary, the Indian subcontinent was from 800 BC (the time of the first
diamond discoveries on record) until 1844 (when diamonds were discov-
ered in Brazil) the world’s only source of diamonds. During the height of
India’s diamond production period in the late 1600s, approximately
50,000 to 100,000 carats were extracted annually from India’s deposits.1
India’s rich past in diamonds is also reflected in many elements of Indian
culture. Early Sanskrit manuscripts contain numerous references to dia-
monds, including elaborate descriptions of precious gemstones and associa-
tions with mythical figures at the foundation of Hinduism, and as Hindu
symbols were incorporated into Buddhism, the diamond became a Bud-
dhist symbol of religious virtue.2 Diamonds have also played a role in
India’s caste system, as the different castes were only permitted to own
1 Indian mines have also produced some of the world’s most famous diamonds, including
the Koh-i-Nur, which was the object of tribal battles from 1304 through 1850, when the East
India Company presented it to Queen Victoria (it later adorned the crown worn by Queens
Alexandria, Mary and Elizabeth), and the Hope Diamond, which was purchased by King
Louis XIV, stolen during the French Revolution and eventually repurchased by Harry
Winston, who donated it to the Smithsonian.
2 The Ratnapariksa, a sixth century text on gems by Buddha Bhatta, noted: ‘He who,
having pure body, always carries a diamond with sharp points, without blemish, free from all
faults; that one, as long as he lives, knows each day will bear some things: happiness,
prosperity, children, riches, grain, cows and meat. He who wears [such] a diamond will see
dangers recede from him whether he be threatened by serpents, fire, poison, sickness, thieves,
flood or evil spirits.’
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diamonds of a specific colour—Brahmins wore white, merchants wore
yellow, lower classes wore gray, and only kings could possess diamonds of
all colours.
Since the discoveries in African mines in the late nineteenth century,
India’s contribution to the world’s diamond production has been extremely
small, leaving control of the diamond market to DeBeers and the diamond
merchants, mostly Jewish and Belgian, who controlled the downstream
distribution chain. However, India’s history and familiarity with gemstones
permitted a re-emergence in the 1980s. For centuries, the Jains of Palanpur,
a religious minority from a parched, dusty village in Northern Gujarat,
served as India’s diamontaires and harvested a centuries-old tradition for
diamond cutting and polishing. The community maintained the tacit skills
required for cutting and polishing diamonds even while India’s role in the
industry receded: before India’s diamond boom, Palanpuri cutters owned
and operated small cutting workshops even as they remained unconnected
to the global market that was dominated by cutters in Israel and Antwerp.
Subseqently, certain entrepreneurial Palanpuris sought to exploit their
community’s rich history and deeply rooted expertise with diamonds. They
turned to the master craftsmen in their home villages and asked them to
guide large-scale cutting operations. Led by this home-grown and hard-to-
replicate expertise, comparatively low labour costs and a global family
network, the Palanpuris’ cutting operations quickly made India a leader in
the diamond industry. Today, nine out of ten diamonds purchased annually
are polished in India, Mumbai is home to an active bourse, Palanpuri
diamond entrepreneurs are among the nation’s wealthiest3 and thousands
of cutting factories, employing over 700,000 Indians, populate nearby
Gujarat province.
This is a classic instance of globalisation, where the size of the global
market for a good (in contrast to the national or regional market)
dramatically heightens the value of certain skills or assets. In many
respects, India’s Palanpuri diamond cutters present the paradigmatic case
of globalisation’s success story—a small community in a remote location is
able to exploit its unique skills to reap fortunes in the global marketplace.
The inevitable flip side is paradigmatic as well, and the Palanpuris’ success
has come at the expense of higher-wage cutters in the West. In fact, the
Palanpuri cost advantages are so significant, and their entry into the
market has been so large, that they have sufficiently disrupted the global
3 One of India’s foremost business journalists remarked: ‘Ordinary people cannot under-
stand how a handful of families, all belonging to one small community—Palanpuri Jains—
have become so rich, so quickly’ (Piramal, 1990). India’s successful Palanpuri families include
Vijay and Bharat Shah, college drop-outs who now operate one of India’s largest corporate
empires. Their interests include operating construction companies and directing one of
Bollywood’s largest movie production companies.
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distribution network to have transformed the face of the industry. Antwerp
is now much less of a haven for wealthy Jewish merchants, while becoming
home to a very substantial Indian community, and Israel’s cutting industry
has been in steady decline. Indian diamontaires have also become deeply
embedded in New York’s diamond market, with an Indian merchant
recently getting elected to the board of New York’s diamond bourse.
India’s success in diamond cutting has fuelled further globalisation, as
many diamond dealers have opened cutting factories in low-wage countries
in Eastern Europe and South-East Asia.
India’s diamond success also offers some generalisable insights into
commercial globalisation. Relational exchange—exchange, such as ethnic
exchange, that relies on the familiarity that commercial parties have with
each other—is in many respects deemed to be inferior to systems of
arms-length transactions and impersonal exchange. Personal exchange
limits entry only to those who are familiar to trading partners, keeping out
the market dynamism introduced by low-cost or innovative entrepreneurs,
and such familiarity requirements also impose limits on the size and
breadth that trading networks can achieve. For these reasons, scholars
have explained that public courts and impersonal exchange have gradually
replaced and supplanted systems that rely on private ordering (Greif,
2006a). The Palanpuris’ success, however, reveals that ethnic trading
networks can flourish in a globalising economy. Furthermore, the Palan-
puris are not alone—it is well documented that the wildly successful
Chinese ethnic trading networks, for example, continue to capitalise on
extra-legal certainty to organise transnational commerce in South-East
Asia (Landa, 1999). Palanpuri success and the success of other ethnic
trading networks illustrate that ethnic networks continue to occupy an
important place in the modern global economy.
However, a stronger point can be made. Commercial networks that can
succeed in an industry like the diamond market, where routine transactions
are beyond the reach of public courts and require extra-legal enforcement,
are strongly suited to excel in global exchange since cross-national trans-
actions are also routinely difficult to enforce. The Palanpuris’ centuries-old
experience with diamonds transactions, which were always imbued with
legal uncertainty, prepared them for the legal uncertainty in transnational
exchange. Since Palanpuris were adept at domestic extra-legal commerce,
they were well equipped for international extra-legal commerce. It is
nonetheless ironic that trading practices resting upon ancient family or
ethnic traditions—thought to have been replaced by sophisticated govern-
ment institutions—can suddenly offer an advantage in the ever-
modernising global economy.
However, even with its advantages, relational exchange has limits, and
continued globalisation will pose a severe test to the durability of the
diamond industry’s ethnic networks. Since reputation-based exchange
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works only with familiarity, relational networks will fail when their
expansions dilute the intimacy the members share. Economic history
contains many illustrations of reputation-based systems of contractual
enforcement that became victims of their own success—transactional
credibility broke down when parties were sufficiently unfamiliar that they
could (and did) misrepresent themselves as reliable, long-term commercial
partners (Greif, 2006b). If the diamond market continues to expand, the
relational constraints of diamond networks might fail to match the growth,
and diamond merchants might have to find alternative systems to organise
distribution.4
Globalisation’s invitation to ethnic-based exchange also invites other
challenges. Just as Palanpuri diamontaires found themselves capable of
succeeding in the international marketplace, other ethnic networks that
have excelled in transnational trade found themselves well positioned to
thrive in the diamond industry. For example, the Palanpuris have been
joined by other ethnic networks, including some recent entrants who
sensed that ethnic connections offer a competitive advantage in the
industry (Richman, 2006). This presents one of globalisation’s more
interesting challenges: how members of different ethnic networks can
engage in commerce—and enforce contracts—with each other. If each
member is beyond the reach of public courts, and thus can only be
disciplined by other members of his or her network, then extra-legal
methods are required to secure transactions between parties from different
relational circles. Theoretically, communities will be incentivised to police
their own members in trade with other groups. If a community’s members
are deemed to be credible business partners for merchants from all groups,
then the business opportunities for each member expands and the commu-
nity as a whole will benefit (Greif, 2004). Putting this into practice,
however, will require substantial political resolve within each community,
and coordinating transactional assurance becomes harder as each trading
community grows and familiarity inevitably decreases.
Still, diamond centres such as Antwerp and New York have successfully
organised cross-community exchange despite the substantial transaction
costs, and many different ethnic networks succeed internationally. Ethnic
networks might be ideally suited to enter and prosper in global exchange,
but since they cannot rest on institutional supports, and instead must
police exchange and compel contractual compliance on their own, they
might be vulnerable to strain as globalisation moves forward.
4 Diamond merchants who are most likely to feel the limits of personal exchange are those
with limited family networks. One Indian dealer lamented: ‘This business demands personal
attention and trust. Only your family can give you both. I have remained a small diamond
exporter because I do not have a brother whom I can send to live in Antwerp’ (Piramal,
1990).
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ENTER ANGOLA, AND DEMAND FOR INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION
Globalisation has also meant the entry of diamond merchants of a very
different kind. Rebel movements and warlords in war-torn African nations,
such as Angola, Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast, have exploited diamond
mines in their countries to fuel their bloody campaigns. The diamond’s
immutable qualities make it the smuggler’s and guerrilla’s currency of
choice.
Turning a blind eye to the unpleasant origins of a product that is
marketed to affluent consumers in developed nations might also be a
central feature of globalised commerce. Salient examples include sweat-
shops manufacturing designer clothing, children forgoing school to assem-
ble athletic equipment, and natural resource exploration that pollutes
farmland and natural habitats (Spar and La Mure, 2003). Stark inequali-
ties in both wages and purchasing habits between the developing and
developed worlds create tremendous incentives to produce in the former
and sell in the latter. This understandably fuels the growing separation of a
product’s origins from its ultimate consumer (Kysar, 2004; Friedman,
2005).
However, this separation creates a particularly acute danger for the
diamond industry. Diamonds are marketed, with remarkable success, as
timeless ornaments to signify important emotional events—the sort of
product that would be quickly spoiled if associated with a brutal warlord.
The possibility that the purchase of the engagement ring heirloom might
sponsor bloody civil strife threatened the core of the industry’s highly
successful advertising efforts and attacked the root of a diamond’s roman-
tic appeal. It became a grave concern for the entire industry.
However, an easy solution is not obvious. Because the structure of the
diamond industry’s distribution network relies on many layers of middle-
men, and because of the diamond’s essential features, tracing a diamond’s
origins is profoundly more difficult than following other goods, such as
designer apparel manufactured by sweatshop labour. Consequently, for
many decades the industry turned a blind eye to the ugly origins of much
of its product. Diamond dealer networks have long operated in Africa and
purchased diamonds from military warlords. Those ‘conflict diamonds’
were then funnelled to Antwerp and other diamond centres and mixed in
with diamonds from less controversial sources. The independence and
multitude of the diamond dealers, the industry’s lack of vertical integration
and the inability to trace a diamond’s origins made prohibiting and
policing such diamond sales extremely difficult.
However, the threat to global demand was too severe to ignore,
particularly as NGOs and social activists—Global Witness in the lead—
organised a highly effective media campaign. The industry, led by DeBeers,
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was compelled to develop a sweeping response. The end solution arrived in
2002 with the creation of the Kimberley Process, a vast international
program to certify the origin of each diamond and to prohibit trade with
countries that could not confirm that their diamond exports did not
finance entities seeking to overthrow a UN-recognised government. The
Kimberley Process requires that each international shipment of rough
diamonds must be transported in a tamper-resistant container and accom-
panied by a government-verified certificate that indicates the origin of each
stone. The importing state’s customs must then confirm that the contents
of the shipment are in accord with the certificate, and each individual who
thereafter handles the stone is obligated to maintain the identity tag.
Although enforcement, the integrity of the certifications and the overall
effectiveness of the Kimberley Process remain unknown and are a matter
for ongoing debate, in theory it provides jewellery manufacturers, reflect-
ing the interests of engagement ring purchasers and other romantics, proof
that the diamonds they purchase come from wholesome origins. Peddlers
of conflict diamonds should have much greater difficulty in finding buyers
and slipping into the mainstream pipeline.
For a number of reasons, DeBeers’s cooperation with global activists
demanding restraints on industry leaders is self-explanatory. The Kimber-
ley Process reduced diamond output and aided DeBeers’s ongoing efforts to
control global supply; it cleansed DeBeers’s brand name of very sordid
associations (although DeBeers has quite a chequered history of its own);
and it created a global infrastructure that adds highly valued assurance to
diamond purchasers. However, it also represents DeBeers’s adjustment to
the politics of globalisation and its willingness to become a partner in an
increasingly typical political manoeuvre.
The lack of public governance in global exchange has prompted a rise in
what some have called ‘private governance’ (Gereffi and Mayer, 2006).
Private governance includes self-regulation by multinational corporations,
codes of conduct promulgated by international organisations and trade
associations, and consumer standards—including the famous ‘fair trade’
movement—that impose minimum labour or production standards. It is
not unprecedented, nor is it unreasonable, for for-profit corporations to
join those demanding private governance and collaborate with social
activists to bring reform: such cooperation was been dubbed ‘the NGO-
industrial complex’ (Gereffi et al, 2001).
However, this sort of international scrutiny and regulation is quite new
to the diamond industry even though, unlike other industries that have
only recently globalised, international distribution networks had always
been required to bring diamonds from mines to jewellery stores. The
globalisation of industries such as textiles and chemicals prompted con-
sumer alarm and the mobilisation of international private governance
because the internationalisation of those industries meant less legal and
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political oversight. The diamond industry, in contrast, was always glo-
balised and had received relatively little scrutiny (despite brutal treatment
of workers in diamond mines, poor labour relations in many cutting
factories and, of course, the prevalence of conflict diamonds). Thus, the
politics of globalisation has meant something very different to the diamond
industry. Ironically, globalisation has meant the involvement of more, not
less, consumer regulation and political scrutiny. Moreover, the regulatory
structures arose to create a legal certainty of a different kind: global
oversight mechanisms now provide consumers with regulatory compliance
certainty. They aim to solve a transactional hazard between the diamond
seller and the uninformed but socially aware consumer.
What lessons can be drawn from the diamond industry’s experience with
the politics of globalisation? Prior to the swell of globalisation, the
diamond industry seemed to avoid the scrutiny it probably deserved. Just
as its transactions remained beyond the reach of public courts, the
industry’s practices remained largely beyond the attention of social activists
and constituencies that demand regulatory oversight. These parallel trends
of nesting outside the public arena are interconnected. Since the industry
was forced to rely on self-governance to police transactions and enforce
contracts, it assumed a self-regulatory governance structure that distrusted
outsiders and demanded regulatory autonomy. However, when globalisa-
tion enabled multinational corporations (MNCs) to escape the regulation
of the industrialised democracies, the political backlash fuelled scrutiny
towards all MNCs active in the developing world, and that included
DeBeers. Diamond sellers now need global private governance to assure
consumers, and instruments of regulatory certainty replace the unsup-
ported anonymous transaction. In short, the general lawlessness of globali-
sation has meant the end to lawlessness in the diamond industry.
ENTER LOUIS VUITTON AND THE POWER OF BRANDS
In 2000, DeBeers launched its own ‘millennium’ diamond, limited edition
stones of the highest quality, of substantial size, and with a microscopic
laser-inscribed DeBeers ‘centenary logo’ etched along the side (each millen-
nium diamond came with its own viewing lens, certificate of assurance
from De Beers and a time capsule). Later that year, DeBeers announced a
plan to market ‘designer diamonds’ with unusual shapes and sizes, with
promises that each stone would exhibit top grades in colour and clarity.
Furthermore, in January 2001, DeBeers created a joint venture with
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton, a leader and trend setter in the
luxury goods market, to create a network of own-brand stores that would
sell, under the DeBeers brand, exclusive lines of diamonds (Handleman,
2000; Weber, 2001). These initiatives—the first to bring the company
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towards the retail market—were in response to several years of declining
DeBeers market share,5 a sense that DeBeers was not fully capturing the
value from its brand name and a decision to execute a change in corporate
strategy (Spar, 2006).
Although DeBeers’s strategic initiatives have garnered complimentary
press coverage, the business world has yet to appreciate how dramatic this
departure is from past practices. For years, DeBeers’s focus on wholesale
distribution was explained by the transaction costs of ‘block booking’. A
famous paper by Roy Kenny and Benjamin Klein observed that for goods
that varied significantly in quality but required substantial measurement
costs to evaluate quality, transaction costs are economised when the good
is sold in bundles in which the price for each individual item is the average
price. Thus, block booking would economise on over-searching and make
productive use of items of below-average quality (Kenny and Klein, 1983).
The Kenny and Klein explanation has been the most generally accepted
understanding of DeBeers’s operations (Hanssen, 2000). It explains both
DeBeers’s unusual distribution methods—selling pre-sorted bundles to
individual sight-holders, sight unseen—and DeBeers’s decision to remain
atop the distribution system as a wholesaler without vertically integrating
downstream.
However, with the DeBeers-LVMH joint venture, Kenny and Klein’s
explanation no longer applies. Somehow, DeBeers now finds value in
integrating downward into the retail market. It also means that DeBeers, in
dealing directly with the ultimate consumer, is bypassing the many layers
of middlemen who had organised the industry’s distribution system for
nearly one millennium.
It is possible that DeBeers’s moves are products of new technologies.
Perhaps the art of diamond cutting has been refined such that DeBeers can
credibly claim that all of its hallmarked stones achieve a certain quality. If
DeBeers can now produce homogeneous branded diamonds, but was
previously unable to, then the branded effort obviates the requisite search
and inspection costs in diamond sales; ie whereas before diamond buyers
needed to inspect each stone carefully, now they might trust DeBeers. A
second explanation points to technological developments of a different
sort. Perhaps the internet and the rising facility to share information has
offered low-cost replacements for the army of middlemen. If a major
value-added activity of these middlemen—a swarm of aggressive brokers
and resellers who gobble and relay market information on available
inventories and the particularities of demand—was to match individual
5 DeBeers’s declining market share was largely attributable to the opening of new diamond
mines, including large finds in Canada and Australia that did not sell through DeBeers’s DTC,
and the periodic departures by Alrosa, Russia’s large mining operation, from the DeBeers
cartel.
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diamonds with optimal buyers, then a branding campaign would obviate
this as well. The DeBeers brand would reflect known characteristics, and
buyers demanding stones of that kind can purchase them directly from the
manufacturer.6 A third explanation is the simplest, that DeBeers is losing
global market share and now has to compete more vigorously against
other suppliers, and its competitive advantage over other mines is its name
recognition. Whereas before, DeBeers invested in advertising for the entire
industry—its ‘Diamonds are Forever’ campaign, in addition to being hailed
by Advertising Age as the slogan of the century, marketed all diamonds,
not just DeBeers diamonds—now it also advertises its own wares. Capital-
ising on its brand name in the retail market might simply be the
competitive response of a former monopolist.
However, DeBeers’s transformation might also shed insight into the
economics of globalisation. Previously, DeBeers stood atop the distribution
chain and relied on ethnic networks to disperse diamonds to local markets.
With globalisation’s convergence of regional markets, the effect of brand-
ing is magnified. A unifying global market decreases the likelihood of
brand confusion, increased communication extends the reach of brand
marketing, and improved brand recognition enables brand holders to build
and capitalise on quality reputation. One might also argue that if globali-
sation has lead to a homogenisation of preferences for luxury goods,
DeBeers’s offering of specific designer stones might, despite the limited
variation, meet the demands of the high-end market as it never could
before. The true lesson is that these globalising forces have created a third
type of legal certainty: the certainty of quality assurances that trademarks
and trademark law are designed to promote. These assurances are useless if
a brand is unfamiliar, but cultural and commercial globalisation might
enable DeBeers to extract previously unattainable value from its brand.
Although it is too early to determine whether DeBeers’s strategy will be
successful, the significance of its reorientation for the rest of the industry
cannot be understated. With its focus on its brand name, DeBeers is using
a vertical integration strategy to supplant the trust-based exchange that for
generations has been organised by ethnic networks.
6 These developments in information technology also suggest that internet sites could
similarly create a forum of information exchange and create virtual diamond exchanges, thus
further obviating the role of middlemen. In fact, several such internet brokerages have
emerged, featuring an inventory of diamond with GIA-certified features and high-resolution
pictures. By some measures, internet sales are growing and have already achieved 15% of all
US sales, but many remain sceptical that internet pictures will erode the perceived need to
personally inspect a diamond before purchase (Berger, 2001; Rozhon, 2005).
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CONCLUSION
The diamond industry’s distribution system had remained intact and
relatively stable for nearly one millennium. It emerged long before the
DeBeers cartel arrived and it has survived technological booms, continental
wars and economic shocks of every sort. However, it is now threatened by
certain forces of globalisation. Globalisation has meant entry by low-wage
ethnic groups that have displaced incumbent Jewish merchants who had
long dominated the downstream market. It has brought political scrutiny
to an industry that previously enjoyed secrecy, autonomy and lawlessness.
Furthermore, it has enabled DeBeers to pursue marketing strategies that
skip the middleman. These developments might mean the end of 1,000
years of Jewish predominance.
However, watching the diamond industry change with globalisation also
yields insights into globalisation itself. The lawlessness of transnational
exchange means that ethnic networks that have historically shunned public
courts and have instead employed extra-legal mechanisms to enforce
transactions are particularly well suited to excel in the globalised economy.
The absence of public regulation to govern global commerce has led to
consumer-driven private governance, which ironically can reach and influ-
ence secretive international networks, such as the diamond networks,
much more than state-sponsored regulation. Furthermore, globalisation
has changed the economics of brand names such that branding strategies
can now reach larger markets and exploit profit opportunities as never
before. De Beers’s recent ventures suggest that vertical integration strate-
gies that focus on maximising value from brand reputations might offer a
superior organisational form than the historic use of multiple middlemen,
personal reputations and trust-based exchange.
Moreover, changes in the diamond industry illustrate new paths through
which globalisation will bring legal certainty. Ethnic networks able to
create transactional certainty in domestic markets have brought additional
security to international commerce. The politics of globalisation and the
corresponding demand for private governance has brought attention to the
origins of diamonds that are later sold in developed nations, and the
Kimberley Process was constructed to provide the regulatory certainty to
assure consumers of their purchase. Furthermore, the expanded reach of
trademarks, which spread on the commercial and cultural currents of
globalisation, give additional meaning to brands and thus bring greater
quality certainty to the global marketplace.
The diamond industry, to be sure, is an unusual industry—few others
can boast features such as a predominance of ethnic networks, artificially
created demand, the rejection of sophisticated public courts in developed
economies and an organisational structure that has remained largely
unchanged for one millennium. However, since ‘the study of extreme
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instances often provides important leads to the essentials of the situation’
(Behavioral Sciences Subpanel, 1962; Williamson, 1999), peering into the
diamond industry, with all its refractions and distortions, produces reveal-
ing insights on the legal, political and economic challenges of the globalis-
ing world.
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